Tribal Mobilization Forces in Iraq
Reality and Future Challenges
In 2014, the Islamic State (Daesh) seized one-third of Iraq’s territory, including Mosul, the country's second largest city. At the same time, there were real fears of the possibility of incursion of ISIS fighters into the capital Baghdad to control it and perhaps even progress towards the southern provinces, amid the state of strange and rapid collapse of the Iraqi armed forces in front of small numbers of this group.
Since then, the Iraqi government has worked with the support of broad regional and international parties and a number of allies, including the United States, to regain control of these territories and free them from the control of ISIS. Then, the US-led international coalition to help Iraq eliminate this group was formed and tens of thousands of Iraqis volunteered after the religious authority in Najaf issued the fatwa of Jihad al-Kafai. This was followed by the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi) to stop the state of collapse and deterioration that struck the Iraqi forces, as well as the confusion that prevailed in the popular communities due to the collapse of other provinces without finding a clear explanation for what happened.
This group began to expand and organize its structure, and most of the volunteers were Shiites. But then many voices called for the need to expand and shared this experience, so as not to take a sectarian character first, not to be a factor for the renewal of regional conflicts and that the people of these occupied areas should participate in the liberation process.
Most of the Iraqi constituents have joined the Popular Mobilization Forces. The failure of Sunni lawmakers to pass the National Guard Law in the Iraqi parliament has pushed Sunni insurgents who want to fight the Islamic State to initially join the Popular Mobilization Forces. They were later called the Popular Mobilization Units. The first nucleus was the Sons of Iraq formed of members of the Sunni tribes with the support of the United States, which then trained and armed them to fight al-Qaeda. Many of the Sunni tribes joined the Popular Mobilization Forces, with the exception of some tribes in the city of Mosul, which joined the Peshmerga.
Are the Popular Mobilization Forces an extension of the Sons of Iraq Forces experience?
Many believe that the experience of the Popular Mobilization Forces is the cloning or extension of the Sons of Iraq’s experience. It recalls the Sons of Iraq strategy devised by US General David Petraeus in Anbar in 2007, which enabled him to attract tribal officers in the province and defeat al-Qaeda at that time. To what extent can that experience be restored today in Anbar or in other Sunni areas to eliminate Daesh?
There are several parties having different views on this subject: One party believes that this experience cannot be repeated and succeed according to the US Propaganda, because of the different situations. The United States today is not that of 2007, because it withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011, and therefore the US leadership does not want to get involved directly in Iraq. It will rather provide advice through its advisers in Iraq, and it is not inconceivable that they advised the Iraqi leadership regarding the issue of tribal mobilization.
Other parties believe that it is possible for this experience to be repeated according to the new name, while overriding the previous mistakes, on condition that the government guarantees it will not leave these fighters after the battles, as the previous government did, which resulted in the elimination of many of the Sons of Iraq leaders by terrorist groups after leaving them without protection and even without salaries.
There is a view saying that the situation now is different because the victory achieved in 2007 in Anbar province over al-Qaeda was due to the effectiveness of US forces and their overwhelming strength. It was not the result of the fighting of members of the Sons of Iraq tribes, which were satisfied with taking over the territory, after Americans excluded al-Qaeda officers, and did not have any effective combat role. This view does not ignore the nature of the changes that have taken place in Anbar over the last eight years, as well as the rise of Daesh as an alternative force to al-Qaeda, and its great potential in terms of equipment and the number of people involved. Moreover, the Sons of Iraq’s experience has been transformed by the leaders of tribal sheikhs into a source of wealth so as to get rich at the expense of equipping, funding and paying salaries of young people involved in the Sons of Iraq forces. This is in addition to another fundamental issue, that Daesh is different from al-Qaeda in terms of arming and funding. Al-Qaeda did not search for a state and did not use the military market, whereas Daesh founded the so-called Caliphate state, used the military market in the battles and spread its cells in most countries of the world. For these reasons, people who hold this opinion believe that the experience of tribal mobilization will not work.
Relationship between the tribal mobilization and the Popular Mobilization Authority:
The relationship between the tribal mobilizations and the Popular Mobilization Authority, which is exclusively responsible for the work of popular mobilization and tribal mobilization, is still hierarchical and needs to be controlled, in light of the increase in the number and diversity of tribal mobilization factions. This is evident in the criticisms of both parties regarding the existence of the so-called aliens and the failure of the Popular Mobilization Authority in the arming, training and equipping of these mobilizations, in addition to the salaries and allowance. The Forces Alliance MP and member of the Security and Defence Committee, Mohammed al-Karbouli, criticized the way the authority deals with the mobilizations and said: “The Parliament’s Security and Defence Committee plans to form a committee to investigate the facts on the disbursement of the tribal mobilization salaries, while the Committee confirmed that it has received complaints about ‘moody’ deductions in the disbursement of these salaries by the Popular Mobilization Authority, and called on Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to ‘intervene’.”
Al-Karbouli claimed that “the Parliament’s Security and Defence Committee intends to form a special committee to investigate the facts about the salaries of the tribal mobilization and disbursement,” stressing that “his committee has received complaints about the existence of monthly deductions from the salaries of the tribal mobilization which fights against terrorist ISIS gangs in al-Anbar, Saladin, Kirkuk and Nineveh provinces.”
Al-Karbouli added that “the salaries of the tribal mobilizations in Amiriyah Fallujah (for example), which included 1850 fighters and decreased to 1500 fighters then to 1300 fighters, puts into question the moodiness of the Popular Mobilization when dealing with the mobilizations of volunteers from the tribes of the Sunni opposition which participate in the operations of liberation and control of land.
Al-Karbouli asked “the commander of the Armed Forces, Haider al-Abadi, and the head of the Popular Mobilization Committee, Faleh al-Fayadh, to reveal their positions regarding these irresponsible practices, which included not only tribal volunteers in al-Anbar, but also tribal volunteers in Saladin, Diyala, Kirkuk and Nineveh provinces.”
As to the Popular Mobilization, the official spokesman for the authority, Ahmed al-Asadi, said that the number of the tribal mobilization fighters in the province of Anbar is about 17000 fighters, in response to accusations by some MPs who said that it includes alien officers.
Al-Asadi said in a press statement that “the accusations by some members of the Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee against the tribal mobilization in al-Anbar province about its inclusion of alien officers are logical, since they are part of their oversight work.” He pointed out that “the provocation of these accusations came against the law of the mobilization, but it is in favour of the adoption of a law that resolves all these differences and represents the real proportions of fighters,” according to the site of the Popular Mobilization.
Al-Asadi added that “the tribal mobilization is affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Authority and its officers are registered.” He noted also that “10900 class A fighters who received regular salaries were registered, in addition to 6000 class B members who received 125,000 dinars (equivalent to $100) the price of food basket and 16,000 fighters receive equipment and weapons only without salaries. This also applies to the mobilizations of other provinces.
Hence, it is predictable that the relationship between these mobilizations and the Popular Mobilization Authority is still affected by partisan and political conflicts and needs to be organized and controlled so that the results are acceptable and successful.
Tribal mobilizations, numbers and distribution:
The tribal mobilization is deployed in Mosul, Saladin and al-Anbar provinces. These mobilizations have experience in fighting and using various types of weapons, as well as land grabbing, which were once the most important weaknesses in the liberated areas. Actually, ISIS used to reoccupy them again because of the weakness of the forces occupying the land.
Al-Jabour tribes, in the Saladin province, in particular are the most powerful force of the tribal mobilization in Iraq. In reality, at the height of its power, ISIS was unable to seize their areas in the province of Saladin, and the tribes were able to face it, like Saladin Brigade led by Asim al-Sabhan al-Jabouri, and tribes of al-Jabour mobilization in Nineveh province under the leadership of Mohammed al-Jabouri.
In Ramadi, the al-Bu’aisi tribes in Amiriyah Fallujah had a major role in confronting the ISIS attacks. They were able to stand firm in the face of ISIS when it took control of Fallujah, but could not control Amiriyah and other cities in al-Anbar. In Amiriyah -Fallujah, dozens of ISIS attacks have been registered, yet it has failed to occupy this area, which represents a remarkable example in its steadfastness and the determination of its fighters.
Brigadier Amiriyah al-Samoud is led by Brigadier General Khamis al-Issawi, and the Fallujah Shield Brigade is led by Colonel Majid al-Mohamadi and includes the regiments of Aifan al-Aifan, Munir al-Aifan, al-Husay regiment and al-Nasaf regiment.
The first formation of the Ramadi tribes fighters, led by Brigadier General Ahmad Abdullah al-Baylawi, the Karma Fallujah Brigade, under the leadership of Sheikh Juma Faz Ali al-Jumaili, and the mobilization of the sons of the West, led by Colonel Jamal Shehab Mahlawi, are considered among the powerful military formations.
Haditha is a prominent example of tribal forces’ control, strength and resilience to the ISIS's attacks. The organization failed many times in occupying the city, and its main goal was to reach and blow up the Haditha Dam, and also to ensure the longest stay in al-Anbar. In this province, there are more than one tribal faction, divided into the tribes of the “Albu Nimr” and “al-Jagayifa,” the largest Haditha tribes. Although they are influenced by partisan agendas, they are all under tribal central leadership. It is estimated that there are 10000 fighters of the tribal mobilization in al-Anbar province, while Nineveh includes 11000, Diyala 1000 and Kirkuk 1000 fighters. The total number is about 25000, and there are much larger numbers of fighters who are not registered and hope to officially join, in addition to other numbers of fighters in Diyala province.
One can notice that the Nineveh province – and due to the existence of different nationalities and parties - includes differences and a variety of parties and loyalties. Some of which is associated with the Turks like the mobilization of Mr. Atheel al-Nujaifi (National Mobilization), which was trained by the Turkish forces based in the Bashiqa camp in coordination with the Kurdistan Region. The mobilization includes more than 6000 fighters, including several former Iraqi army officers.
Below are the most important tribal mobilization factions that are officially affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Authority and that receive orders from the authority which pays in return the salaries and weapons of these mobilizations.
Names and leaders of Sunni factions:
1 - Brigade Amiriyah al-Somoud which is led by Brigadier Khamis al-Issawi and located in Amiriyah al-Somouda, east of Fallujah.
2 - Fallujah Shield Brigade that is led by Colonel Majid al-Muhammadi and under the supervision of Issa al-Sayer al-Issawi, the city’s mayor. It includes the regiments of Aifan al-Aifan, Munir Al-Aifan, Al-Husay regiment and Al-Nassaf regiment.
3 - Nakhwa al-Nashami Forces which are led by Sheikh Rafie al-Fahdawi and deployed in the city of Ramadi, the centre of al-Anbar province.
4 - Al-Nawader Forces which are led by Sheikh Abdul Rahim al-Shammari, a deputy in the Iraqi parliament within the Iraqi National Bloc, and deployed in the Rabia area, northwest of Nineveh province.
5 - The Bairaq of Iraq (the Mobilization of al-Sabawin) which is led by Sheikh Muqdad Sheikh Fares Al - Abdullah al-Sabawi. This mobilization is among the oldest ones which were formed in the Makhmor area, east of the Tigris River, and founded by the martyr Sheikh Fares al-Sabawi.
6 - Ahrar Al-Furat that is under the leadership of Abdullah al-Jughifi and deployed in the Haditha, west of al-Anbar province.
7 – The Peninsula Shield Force that is led by Colonel Mezher al-Baylawi and deployed in the desert of the island between Nineveh and al-Anbar.
8 - North of Ramadi Tribes Mobilization which is led by Major General Tariq al-Asal.
9 - Al-Jabour Tribes Mobilization in Nineveh governorate which is under the leadership of Mohammed al-Jubouri and deployed in the Qayyarah district in the south.
10 - Martyr Amaya Jabara Military Regiment that is led by Wans al-Jubouri. This regiment played an important role in fighting terrorist groups in the province of Saladin, specifically in al-Alam area.
11 - Fraternity Regiment which is led by Yassin Hussein al-mosleh al-Jubouri and deployed in al-Shirqat district, north of Saladin province.
12 - Tanaya Regiment which is under the leadership of Sheikh Hamoud al-Mayah and deployed in al-Shirqat district, north of Saladin province.
13- Albu Tohme Regiment that is led by Mahdi Saleh al-Jubouri and deployed in Saladin province.
14. Salah al-Din Brigade which is led by Asim al-Sabhan al-Jubouri and deployed in Saladin province.
15- Ahrar al-Karmah Regiment that is led by Colonel Mohammad Merhi al-Jumaili, and Sarkhat al-haq Regiment which is led by Colonel Jumaa al-Jumaili and pertains to the 30th Brigade in the popular mobilization that is led by Abu Abdullah al-Fahdawi.
16 - The First Formation of Ramadi Tribes Fighters which is led by Brigadier Ahmad Abdullah al-Baylawi.
17 – Al-Karmah Fallujah Brigade which is under the leadership of Sheikh Jumaa Fazaa bin Ali al-Jumaili.
18 – Abnaa al-Ghabia Mobilization that is led by Colonel Jamal Shihab al-Mahlawi and deployed in the city of Ramadi, Anbar province.
19 - Sheikh Ali al-Nimrawi Brigades which is under the leadership of Ali Abdul Freih and deployed in the city of Ramadi, Anbar province.
20- Al-Mansur Tribal Mobilization which is led by Colonel Saddam al-Samarmed and deployed in Saladin province.
21 - Southern Mosul Mobilization which is under the leadership of Sheikh Nazhan Sakhr al-Lihaybi. This faction is deployed in the Makhmur district of Nineveh province and al-Shirqat district of Anbar province.
22- Ratba Desert Hawks Regiment that is led by Sheikh Shaker Abu Risha and deployed in the Ratba desert.
23- Al-Tahadi Mobilization Force which is led by Sheikh Watban al-Rimah and deployed in the al-Hadar district, south of Nineveh province.
24- Al-Jabour Tribe Mobilization Force that is led by Sheikh Khaled Al-Sabah and deployed in Nimrud, east of Nineveh province.
25- Al-Dulaim al-Muhamdah Mobilization Force which is under the leadership of Sheikh Kahlan al-Hassoud and deployed in the city of Ramadi, Anbar province.
26 - Regiment 24 that is led by Muhannad Sayab. It comprises 300 fighters who are affiliated to the Minister of Education Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, known as Mohammed Iqbal Mobilization, and it is deployed in the city of Mosul, the center of Nineveh province.
There are other Sunni factions affiliated to the Mobilization Forces, which are :
27- Qayyarah Martyrs that is led by Sheikh Mohammed al-Muraayid.
28- A Mobilization Force led by Abdul Karim Madlul al-Jarba and deployed in the Shammer area, west of Nineveh province.
29- A Mobilization Force led by Thiab al-Shammari in the city of Mosul.
30- A Mobilization Force led by Abdullah As’ad al-Basha and deployed in the city of Mosul.
31- A Mobilization Force led by Ahmad Madlul al-Jarba and deployed in al-Ba’aj district, south-west of Nineveh province.
32- A Mobilization led by Faisal Watban al-Jarba and deployed in the Shammer area, west of Nineveh province.
33- A Mobilization led by Safok al-Yawar and deployed in the Shammer area, west of Nineveh province.
34- Al-Jawaena Mobilization which is led by Sheikh Hamidi al-Joani and deployed in Qayyarah district, south of Nineveh province.
35- A Mobilization led by Sheikh Abdul Rahman Al-Tabour and deployed in Qayyarah district, south of Nineveh governorate.
36- Al-Karrar mobilization which is led by Muhammad al-Waka’a and deployed in the city of Mosul that represents the center of Nineveh province.
37- Al-hadar Mobilization which is led by Sheikh Hawass al-Ahmadi.
38- Taloul al-Baj Mobilization and Ahmed Mehdi Saleh al-Shammari Mobilization.
39- Hamam al-Alil Mobilization which is led by Sheikh Nassif.
40- Al-Nimroud Mobilization which is led by Ahmad Al-Jawari.
41- Al-Hadidiyin Tribes Mobilization which is led by Sheikh Ahmad Al-Warshan, near the area of Hamam al-Alil in the Nineveh province.
42- A Mobilization led by Amer al-Sinjari which is deployed in the city of Mosul, center of Nineveh province.
43- A Mobilization led by Hisham al-Hamdani and is deployed in the city of Mosul, center of Nineveh province.
44- Al-Jubour Knights which is led by MP Ahmed al-Jubouri. Al-Jubouri said in a personal call that al-Jubour Knights Mobilization was formed on 25 July, 2016, and fought since the first day of the launch of the battles to liberate Mosul. According to the MP, the tribe of al-Jubour in Mosul includes up to 8000 fighters distributed to al-Jubour Knights Mobilization, al-Jubour Commando Mobilization and al-Jubour Martyrs Mobilization. He denied his mobilizations’ connection with any political entity and confirms that the affiliation is with the tribe only.
However, there are probably even larger numbers of these mobilizations, but they are not registered and not considered official because of the fact that the popular mobilization is limited to certain numbers of fighters. This is in addition to problems related to financial issues in light of the large budget deficit and due to low oil prices, as well as the restoration of Iraqi forces with its various formations, including the army, police, federal, rapid intervention and the anti-terrorism body, and its ability to liberate areas gradually. This enabled the government to concentrate its efforts to support the regime forces and deal with the problem of controlling arms in a post-ISIS period, which is the most serious challenge that the government faces after the eradication of terrorism.
The future of the Tribal Mobilizations and their impact on the political Sunni house:
Many agree that there are major challenges facing the Sunni Tribal Mobilization, including those within the same mobilization or with the Popular Mobilization as an authority of the Iraqi state, or within the Sunni movement itself. I will address these challenges in detail.
1. Challenges within the Tribal Mobilization:
The divisions of tribal members and leaders seem to have contributed to the fragility of its system and made it weak and unable to maneuver beyond areas of its control, which has become his area of influence and power, and perhaps the highest level of its ambition. This is evident in the Sunni provinces of al-Anbar, Saladin and Nineveh.
These divisions resulted in the formation of factions according to tribes and regions, and even according to parties; those that support some factions in some areas of control, and perhaps areas of the grassroots that are intended to monopolize partisan interests. In the city of Ramadi, the center of al-Anbar province, the picture appears to be rather clear. The number of disputes, conflicts and divisions among these factions is growing. There are many loyalties, some belong to political parties, and others belong to the tribe and the region. Most of them are aimed at protecting their areas and controlling their reconstruction projects, which made these factions and their leaders live in a state of chaos that is characterized by suspicions of corruption, according to some leaders. This is in addition to the presence of large numbers known as “aliens,” and this has made the Iraqi government and the Popular Mobilization Authority pursue this file, and hold a number of those involved in it accountable.
There are other dangers, which are these mobilizations did not prove their efficiency in previous experiments on the subject of land grabbing after liberation, for several reasons including the weakness of training and armament, and most importantly that these forces, although located in the territory of al-Anbar province, the majority does not abide by the orders of local and field commanders, and often implement agendas of parties, entities and orientations from outside the province. In Saladin and Mosul, this scene will not be different. In Saladin province, and particularly after liberation, we witnessed the severe disputes between the tribes, as well as the political disputes in the provincial council that overthrew two governors, and these conflicts continue up to the present day.
In Nineveh, too, the struggle between numerous tribal mobilizations is noticeable: some relate to political forces and others to regional forces, in addition to the state of rivalry and disagreement among members of the provincial council. These conflicts may escalate after the liberation of the city of Mosul.
2. Challenges with the Popular Mobilization Authority:
The conflict between Tribal Mobilizations’ leaderships has influenced the relationship with the Popular Mobilization Authority as an institution responsible for organizing and leading the Popular Mobilization as a whole. Conflicts are over issues that range from demands to pay salaries, dues and armament to the subject of who will face the leadership of each of the Sunni provinces, as well as the subject of corruption and the existence of a number of “alien” imaginary elements. This is in addition to fears which may be undeclared, namely that after the liberation of these provinces and the possession of power and weapons, these mobilizations may constitute a threat to the Iraqi government through a coup attempt.
“The resort to the armed forces, especially factions, is inevitable amid an atmosphere in which communities fear for their security and safety,” said Ramzi Mardini, a researcher at the Atlantic Research Center. He added: “The war has not only added the military character to the Iraqi society, but it seems that there is no pressure from the leadership or willingness from the base to give up arms, lay off insurgents and reintegrate the factions that now occupy the former complex insurgency battleground.”
3 - Challenges of the Tribal Mobilization with the political Sunni house:
Perhaps this challenge represents the greatest and most serious of these challenges. With the growing conflict within the Shiite Movement of the National Alliance and the conflict within the Kurdish movement, the Sunni house is not as good as the other two movements, if not the worst and most dangerous. The Sunni political class suffers from a problem of disconnection with its popular base which is bitter about its leadership that it elected in the parliament and provincial councils, since they left more than four million displaced persons in DP camps without visiting them or seeing their poor living conditions. These leaders settled in Jordan, the UAE, or Erbil, lived a life of luxury, and were preoccupied with side conflicts among them. There are more than five wings within this coalition. The other thing is that the majority of these leaders did not participate in carrying weapons and contribute to the liberation of their provinces, while there were Shiite deputies who took up arms and participated in liberating the Iraqi land from the ISIS. Everyone saw how the members of al-Anbar Provincial Council, particularly after the liberation, distributed compensations among them from the funds provided by the Iraqi government for the displaced. Actually, the chairman of al-Anbar Provincial Council compensated himself with one billion and seven hundred million Iraqi dinars for the destruction of his house, and another member of the Council took a compensation of two billion and two hundred million dinars, which led the Prime Minister al-Abadi to cancel these compensations.
As for the National Guard Law, the Iraqi Forces Coalition, which considers itself the sole political and parliamentary representative of the Sunni movement in Iraq, was not able to approve it in the Iraqi Parliament. The adoption of the law, thus, with the presence of the Iraqi Forces Coalition in the political process, was a big blow to it. This may threaten its popularity that is mainly declining among its supporters, whom the Coalition has always said are demanding a position on many issues related to the Sunni component. Supporters believe that these issues cause worry, meaning that its constituency would not elect it in any future election.
The enactment of the Popular Mobilization law would be tantamount to taking away territory officially and publicly from the Iraqi Forces Coalition in favour of Sunni Tribal factions that participated in the fighting along with the Popular Mobilization. 34 armed factions affiliated with these groups were formed and integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces since its formation in June 2014, under the names of the tribal mobilization and other tribes. Therefore, these parties will present themselves as a true representative of the Sunni component, because they defended it and experienced its suffering throughout the period that representatives of the Forces Coalition failed to provide what supporters aspire.
It is noteworthy that a number of deputies of the Iraqi Forces Coalition voted in favour of the Popular Mobilization law, which confirms the presence of political figures from within the coalition who began to be detached from it, especially those who supported the accession of militant tribal factions of the Sunni component to the Mobilization Forces. These figures did not describe the Popular Mobilization Forces as Shiite, though most of their fighters are Shiite volunteers or military wings of Shiite parties and armed resistance factions. 208 deputies voted for the law of the mobilization, with only 149 deputies affiliated to the National Iraqi Alliance, which includes the Shiite blocs in the Council of Representatives. This confirms the lack of consensus on the rejection of the law by representatives of the Sunni component in the Council, especially the Iraqi Forces Coalition, although a number of deputies from other blocs supported the law.
We have seen that the extent of the dispute in the Sunni house has increased, and that there are new Sunni forces, represented by the Tribal Mobilization leaders, which see themselves eligible to be the next representative of the Sunnis in Iraq, because they fought ISIS, sacrificed their lives in the defence of their provinces and did not leave Iraq, in addition to the existence of support perhaps from the Shiite political circles. The same applies to the National Alliance, whose leadership is afraid of the growing role of the leaders of the Popular Mobilization in light of their popularity after the battles of liberation, which reduces the Coalition leadership’s chances in the upcoming elections.
The Tribal Mobilization experience remains a short experience period with many pros, but also cons. The Iraqi government can develop this experience in order to maintain the security and stability of the provinces. These mobilizations of reserve and emergency forces are used in risk situations, in return for not leaving these fighters after the end of the fighting without resources, by including some of them in the security forces of the army and police and helping the rest with loans for small agricultural and industrial projects. In this way, the government will kill two birds with one stone. First, it would contain these fighters and not leave them after the end of battles as what happened in the Sons of Iraq coalitions experience. Second, they will contribute to the development of the Iraqi economy, which suffers from problems, through the projects that will probably provide work for a significant number of the unemployed. This is on condition that these mobilizations should be kept away from the influence and control of the parties and that they should be loyal to homeland and not to the parties.
1 - Statement of the spokesman for the Popular Mobilization, Ahmed al-Assadi, to the news channel NRT Arabic.,
2 - Mahmoud Said, the Tribal Mobilization: Composition and Objectives, vision network, 26 June, 2017.
3 - Statement of MP Mohammed al-Karbouli to the Al Jazeera Net site on 23-7-2016
4 - Renad Mansour, The Popular Mobilization and Iraq’s Future, Marco Carnegie Middle East, 28 April, 2017.
5 - Faleh Abdul Jabbar, the same source.
6 - An-Nahar newspaper, which are the Sunni parties benefiting from the Popular Mobilization Act, 27 November, 2016.
7- Thamer al-Tamimi Abu Azzam, assistant to the head of the Popular Mobilization Authority, a special meeting.
8 - Hussein Dawood, tribal mobilizations threaten with chaos in Mosul, al-Hayat newspaper, 22-7-2017.
9- Hisham al-Hashimi, Categories of the Popular Mobilization Authority Factions, HuffPost, 21-8-2017.
10- Rajih al-Khouri, The Sunni Tribal Mobilization to Defeat Daesh, Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, No. 13360, 27 June, 2015.
11- Wathaq al-Hashimi, Post-Daesh Challenges to Stabilization in Iraq, Research and Lecture Presented at al-Furat Center for Development and Strategic Studies and published in al-Naba’a Center Site.